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ABSTRACT
For empirical purposes, value stocks are usually defined as those traded at low price-to-earnings ratios 
(stock prices divided by earnings per share), low price-to-book ratios (stock prices divided by book value 
per share) or high dividend yields (dividends per share divided by stock prices). Growth stocks, on the 
other hand, are traded at high price-to-earnings ratios, high price-to-book ratios or low dividend yields. 
Academic research so far produced, international and Brazilian alike, shows that value stocks outperform 
growth stocks, challenging the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which states that the market prices of traded 
stocks are the best estimate of their intrinsic values. Most studies use a single ratio to sort stocks on per-
centiles; risks (generally defined as beta or standard deviations) and returns are then calculated for the 
resulting value and growth portfolios. In the present paper, we aim to further contribute to the growing 
literature on the field by applying a method not previously tested on the Brazilian market. We build portfo-
lios sorted by the price-to-earnings and price-to-book ratios alone and by a combination of both in order 
to assess value and growth stocks’ risks and returns on the Brazilian stock market between 1989 and 2009. 
Furthermore, our risk analysis may be regarded as the paper’s main contribution, since its approach de-
parts from conventional risk concepts, as we not only test for beta: portfolios’ returns are measured under 
different economic conditions. Results support a pervasive value premium in the Brazilian stock market. 
Risk analysis shows that this premium holds under every economic condition analyzed, suggesting that 
value stocks are indeed less risky. Beta proved not to be a satisfactory risk measure. Portfolios sorted by the 
price-to-earnings ratio yielded the best results. 
Keywords: Value Stocks. Growth Stocks. Market Efficiency. Emerging Markets. Brazilian Stocks. 
BM&FBovespa.
RESUMO
Para fins de pesquisas empíricas, ações de valor são geralmente definidas como aquelas negociadas a baixos 
índices preço/lucro (preço da ação dividido pelos lucros por ação), baixos índices preço/valor patrimonial (preço 
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da ação dividido pelo valor patrimonial por ação) ou altos dividend yields (dividendos por ação divididos pelo 
preço da ação). Ações de crescimento, por outro lado, são aquelas negociadas a altos índices preço/lucro, altos 
índices preço/valor patrimonial ou baixos dividend yields. Pesquisas acadêmicas brasileiras e internacionais 
mostram que as ações de valor têm melhor desempenho do que as de crescimento, contrariando a Hipótese de 
Mercados Eficientes, que estabelece que os preços de mercado das ações são as melhores estimativas de seus 
valores intrínsecos. A maioria dos estudos utiliza um único múltiplo para classificar carteiras em percentis; 
riscos (geralmente definidos como coeficiente beta ou desvio-padrão) e retornos são então calculados para as 
carteiras de valor e de crescimento. No presente paper, busca-se contribuir para a crescente literatura sobre 
o tema empregando uma metodologia ainda não testada no mercado brasileiro. Construíram-se carteiras 
classificadas pelos índices preço/lucro e preço/valor patrimonial, isoladamente e em conjunto, para calcular 
riscos e retornos no mercado acionário brasileiro no período 1989-2009. Ademais, a análise de risco pode ser 
considerada a principal contribuição do paper, uma vez que a abordagem diverge de tradicionais métricas 
de risco, já que não se testou apenas o coeficiente beta: os retornos das carteiras são medidos em diferentes 
estados da economia. Os resultados indicam um consistente prêmio de valor no mercado acionário brasileiro. 
A análise de risco mostra que esse prêmio ocorre em todos os estados da economia analisados, o que sugere 
que as ações de valor são realmente menos arriscadas. O beta não se mostrou uma medida satisfatória de 
risco. As carteiras classificadas pelo índice preço/lucro produziram os melhores resultados.
Palavras-chave: Ações de Valor. Ações de Crescimento. Eficiência de Mercado. Mercados Emergentes. Ações 
Brasileiras. BM&F Bovespa
 1  INTRODUCTION
Academic research on Value Investing 
seemed to lie dormant well into the 1990s, 
in spite of the pioneering study by Basu 
(1977), the half-century-old teachings of 
Benjamin Graham – who, on 1934, laid bare 
the foundations of the discipline (GRAHAM 
AND DODD, 1934) – and the remarkable 
investment stories of many of his followers, 
notably Berkshire Hathaway’s Warren Buffett, 
whose 24-year-long investment history 
produced a 20.3% compounded growth 
(BUFFETT, 2010). Part of the blame can be 
attributed to the intellectual dominance of 
the Efficient Markets School (EMS), whose 
models and theories became the paradigms 
of choice of the academic community. In 
a nutshell, the EMS propounds that agents 
are rational, the market prices of tradable 
securities are the best estimate of their 
intrinsic values and higher returns always 
entail higher risks (for a brief overview 
of market efficiency, see DIMSON AND 
MUSSAVIAN, 1998. The EMS has been 
criticized by, among others, MANDELBROT, 
2004). Conversely, Value Investing’s 
practitioners regard markets as inherently 
inefficient: investors often bid market prices 
away from intrinsic values, allowing for the 
purchase of undervalued securities, which 
tend to produce better returns in the long 
run (see GREENWALD ET AL., 2001). 
Rationality is indeed limited, for market 
agents are human beings, psychologically 
and neurologically unfit for investing (see 
BARBERIS AND THALER, 2003 and 
ZWEIG, 2007), who from time to time fall 
victim to market fads (see KINDLEBERGER, 
2005 and CHANCELLOR, 2000).  
According to Chan and Lakonishok 
(2004), researchers’ interest was aroused 
by the studies of Fama and French (1992) 
and Lakonishok et al. (1994). Both have 
shown that value stocks outperform growth 
stocks (for empirical purposes, value stocks 
are defined as stocks traded at low market 
prices relative to fundamentals like net 
profits, book value, sales and dividends. The 
opposite holds true for growth stocks). In 
their line of research, a plethora of studies on 
different markets helped to establish Value 
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Investing’s dominance, casting doubts on 
the EMS’ propositions. Nonetheless, given 
the worldwide publicity of the studies, the 
reasons for the superior performance remain 
controversial. Market efficiency-oriented 
researchers view value stocks as inherently 
riskier than growth stocks, yielding, therefore, 
higher returns. They take this stance despite 
the fact that traditional risk measures, such 
as beta and standard deviation, are shown 
to be generally smaller for value stocks (or, 
at most, disproportionately small relative to 
their higher returns). Behavioral-oriented 
researchers, on the other hand, view value 
stocks as less risky than growth stocks and 
maintain that their superior performance 
stems from behavioral and agency issues.
Most studies so far produced, international 
and Brazilian alike, focus on what can be 
dubbed one-dimensional strategies. A 
single multiple such as price-to-earnings 
(P/E, the ratio of the stock’s market price 
to the company’s profits) or price-to-book 
(P/B, the ratio of the stock’s market price to 
the company’s book value) is used to sort 
stocks into percentiles, producing different 
portfolios. The one with the lowest multiples 
stands for the value (“cheap”) portfolio; at the 
other end of the spectrum lies the growth 
(“expensive”) portfolio. Risks and returns are 
then calculated for each portfolio. 
The economic motivation for selecting 
stocks according to these multiples comes 
primarily from two behavioral issues: 
overreaction and reversion to the mean. 
Graham (2006) sustains that the “manic-
depressive Mr. Market” overreacts, 
leading securities’ prices, momentarily or 
throughout long periods, away from their 
intrinsic values and their historical average. 
Debondt and Thaler (1985) tested the 
overreaction hypothesis and concluded that 
losing portfolios (made up of stocks that 
underperformed the market in the five years 
prior to portfolio formation) outperformed 
winning portfolios (those that outperformed 
the market in the five years prior to portfolio 
formation), even though the latter were 
riskier. Debondt and Thaler (1989) also 
tested the reversion to the mean hypothesis 
and concluded that stock prices do revert to 
the mean, either in a long-term perspective 
or after extreme market movements. Thus, 
low P/Es and low P/Bs are expected to 
capture, in a single metric, the excesses of 
pessimism and the failure of investors to 
consider reversion to the mean.
This line of research was somewhat 
changed by the aforementioned study by 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) in two equally 
relevant ways. First, they put forward the 
concept of a two-dimensional strategy in 
which two variables are combined, so that 
the resulting portfolios take account of both 
past and future performance. This strategy 
outperformed one-dimensional strategies 
and its rationale is explained, according to 
the authors, by the belief that stocks become 
over or underpriced due to various reasons, 
ranging from “extrapolating past earnings 
growth too far into the future, to assuming 
a trend in stock prices, to overreacting to 
good and bad news, or to simply equating 
a good investment with a well-run company 
irrespective of price” (LAKONISHOK ET AL., 
1994, p. 1542). The authors therefore define 
growth stocks as those that have performed 
well in the past and are expected to perform 
well in the future. As investors bid them 
up, they become overpriced. The opposite 
happens to stocks that have shown poor past 
performances: they are dumped by investors, 
becoming underpriced value stocks. Second, 
they went beyond traditional risk measures 
as they measured the performance of value 
and growth portfolios in different states of 
the economy. The underlying assumption 
was that value stocks would be riskier than 
growth stocks if they underperformed the 
latter in “bad” states of the economy, such 
as recessions and bear markets, due to the 
fact that, in these states, the marginal utility 
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of wealth is higher. Their results have shown 
that value stocks are indeed less risky since 
they outperform growth stocks in every 
state of the economy analyzed and, most 
important of all, the results are even better 
in negative states.
Following in their footsteps, Chin et al. 
(2002) tested two-dimensional strategies 
in the New Zealand market and found 
that they outperform one-dimensional 
strategies. They did not, however, test the 
risk proposition advanced by Lakonishok 
et al. (1994). Athanassakos (2009), on the 
other hand, tested the risk proposition for 
portfolios sorted on P/E and P/B alone and 
alongside beta and size on the Canadian stock 
market. He found evidence of a pervasive 
value premium and better performances 
for the value strategy in every state of the 
economy analyzed.
To our knowledge, no previous study on 
the Brazilian market tested both propositions. 
One-dimensional and multivariate studies 
abound, showing that value stocks outperform 
growth stocks and are generally less risky 
(see, for example, RAMOS ET AL., 2000, 
ROSTAGNO ET AL., 2003, BRAGA AND 
LEAL, 2004, LOPES AND GALDI, 2007 and 
GALDI, 2008). None of them, however, tested 
for the two-dimensional strategies put forward 
by Lakonishok et al (1994). Risk analyses are 
generally based on traditional risk measures 
such as beta, standard deviation and the 
Sharpe Coefficient, but not on the assessment 
of risks under different states of the economy, 
which casts a wholly different light upon 
the subject, as it does not equate risk with 
volatility (arguably, volatility, by itself, might 
not be a proper risk measure for investors 
with long-term horizons). Moreover, most 
Brazilian studies focus on 10-year periods 
at most. Our paper, on the other hand, 
encompasses a 20-year period which, besides 
the obvious advantage of length, was shaped 
by five years of rampant hyperinflation and 
15 years of monetary stability. 
Thus, the present paper aims to 
contribute to the growing academic 
literature by doing both. Throughout a 
20-year period, we test for one- and two-
dimensional strategies on the Brazilian 
stock market and measure the risk of both 
strategies, assessing their performance in 
different states of the economy. For the sake 
of completeness, we also test for beta.
Before discussing our method, we 
present a brief summary of the key results 
found in the literature. Fama and French 
(1992) studied the American market from 
1963 to 1990 and found a monthly value 
premium of 1.53 percentage points (p.p.) 
when sorting on P/Es and one of 0.68 p.p 
when sorting on P/Bs (betas were almost 
identical). Lakonishok et al (1994) tested 
different sorting strategies in the same 
market and period. When sorting on P/Es 
and P/Bs, for example, they found 5-year 
compound premiums of 67 p.p. and 90 
p.p. respectively (again, the differences in 
betas were negligible). When using two-
dimensional strategies, they attained a 104 
p.p. 5-year composite value premium for 
the pair of variables P/E and GS (growth 
of sales). As already mentioned, value 
portfolios performed better in bad states 
of the economy, being thus less risky. Chin 
et al (2002) found a 78 p.p. three-year 
compound cumulative value premium for 
the two-dimensional P/E+P/B portfolio 
on the New Zealand market during the 
1988-1995 period. Athanassakos (2009) 
investigated the Canadian market, using 
data from the 1985-2005 period, and found 
an average yearly value premium of 6.30 
p.p. (when sorting on P/Es) and a consistent 
outperformance of the value portfolios in 
every state of the economy analyzed. 
Brazilian studies reached similar 
conclusions. Ramos et al. (2000) found 
lower risks for value stocks and a 
cumulative 114.30 p.p. value premium on 
P/B-sorted portfolios during the 1988-
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1994 period. Rostagno et al. (2003) tested 
various value strategies throughout the 
1994-2003 period. They found lower risks 
(measured as better Sharpe ratios) and 
a cumulative 304.57 p.p. value premium 
on P/E-sorted portfolios. Braga and Leal 
(2004) investigated the 1991-1998 period, 
using deflated numbers. They found a 
cumulative 155.03 p.p. value premium on 
P/B-sorted portfolios and better Sharpe 
ratios for value stocks. Lopes and Galdi 
(2007) tested the Brazilian market from 
1994 to 2004 and found that value stocks 
(sorted by P/B) that are financially strong 
do generate higher returns than financially 
weak value stocks. The premium for two-
year market adjusted returns was 77.8 p.p. 
They point out, however, that results were 
largely influenced by “small, low liquidity 
or highly indebted firms” (LOPES AND 
GALDI, 2007). Galdi (2008) applied a 
similar approach using P/E instead of P/B. 
Premiums for portfolios held for two years 
amounted to 109.6 pp.
 2  RESEARCH METHOD
 Table 1  Resulting portfolios for the two-dimensional strategy
Ratio Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 Portfolio 5 Portfolio 6 Portfolio 7 Portfolio 8 Portfolio 9
P/E Q1 Q1 Q1 Q2, Q3 Q2, Q3 Q2, Q3 Q4 Q4 Q4
P/B Q1 Q2, Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2, Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2, Q3 Q4
Our data set comprises the period from 
December 1988 to April 2009. We build one-
dimensional portfolios sorted by the P/E 
and the P/B ratios. The two-dimensional 
portfolios combine both ratios. We apply a 
buy-and-hold strategy and our portfolios 
are built every April 30th, to ensure that 
accounting results for the previous fiscal 
year (earnings per share and book value) 
were already made public. Thus, P/Es are 
defined as the stock’s market prices on April 
30th of year t divided by the respective 
earnings per share on year t-1. P/Bs use 
book value on the denominator. Therefore, 
the first portfolios are built using market 
prices on April 30th, 1989 and each firm’s 
1988 accounting results. Portfolios are held 
for a year and the corresponding returns and 
betas are then calculated using market prices 
on April 30th of the year subsequent to the 
portfolio’s formation. The last portfolios are 
built on 2008, using 2007 accounting data 
and 2009 market data for the measurement 
of returns.
In the one-dimensional strategy, we sort 
stocks into quartiles. The first quartile, the 
one with the lowest P/Es or P/Bs, represents 
the value portfolio; the fourth, the growth 
portfolio. For the two-dimensional strategy, we 
take intersections to build the portfolios shown 
below in Table 1. Portfolio 1 stands for the value 
portfolio; Portfolio 9 for the growth portfolio.
All portfolio returns are equally weighted. 
We do not calculate market-adjusted returns 
since we do not aim to compare portfolios 
returns with the overall market returns, 
but rather to assess the value premium 
(measured as the spread between the value 
and the growth portfolios) throughout 
different holding periods. When calculating 
returns, we do not account for taxes and 
transaction costs.
We use Brazilian Central Bank data 
for per capita GDP and Economatica’s 
database for accounting and market data, 
which are adjusted for splits, reverse stock 
splits and dividends and deflated by IPCA, 
a Brazilian consumer price index. Deflated 
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 Table 2  Real per capita GDP change 
and inflation-adjusted Ibovespa index (at year-
end closing prices)
Year Real per capita GDP change
Inflation-adjusted 
Ibovespa index
1988 -1.9% 6,577.68
1989 1.4% 5,909.99
1990 -7.1% 1,402.07
1991 -0.7% 5,914.70
1992 -2.2% 5,412.81
1993 3.3% 11,629.84
1994 4.2% 13,495.03
1995 2.6% 10,702.52
1996 0.6% 15,996.24
1997 1.8% 22,017.27
1998 -1.5% 14,410.80
1999 -1.2% 33,325.95
2000 2.8% 28,076.34
2001 -0.2% 23,201.19
2002 1.2% 17,111.33
2003 -0.2% 30,894.01
2004 4.3% 33,824.99
2005 1.9% 40,872.48
2006 2.7% 52,678.30
2007 4.9% 72,443.95
2008 4.0% 40,205.43
Source: Brazilian Central Bank (2010) and Economatica
numbers are central to our model for 
two reasons: first, our data set comprises 
both the 1989-1993 hyperinflation period 
(prior to the advent of the “Plano Real”) 
and the post-1994 more stable period 
and second, there is a gap between the 
publication of accounting statements and 
the date established for the portfolios’ 
construction (April, 30th). It should also 
be underlined that Brazilian accounting 
rules prior to 1994 allowed for balance 
sheet adjustments for inflation (for the 
reason that the figures would otherwise 
be meaningless). These adjustments were 
already factored in the data provided by 
Economatica.
To ensure an adequate degree of 
liquidity, we limit our sample to the top 
100 non-financial Brazilian companies by 
market value. We exclude companies that 
have shown accounting losses or negative 
book value in the fiscal year prior to 
portfolio formation. We also exclude stocks 
that were not traded on April, 30th of the 
subsequent year. As a result, the number of 
stocks in our sample ranged from 45 to 94, 
81 being the average. 
To test the risk proposition advanced 
by Lakonishok et al. (1994), we define 
four states of the economy: bull and bear 
markets, expansions and contractions. Bull 
markets were the years when the Ibovespa 
stock index grew in real terms (1991, 1993, 
1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2003-2007); the 
opposite defines bear markets. Expansions 
were the years when Brazilian real per capita 
GDP advanced (1989, 1993-1997, 2000, 
2002, 2004-2008); the opposite defines 
contractions. Besides these four states, we 
also calculate results for the total period, 
the first and second half, the 1989-1993 
period (the years before the Plano Real, 
being thus characterized by high inflation 
and economic instability) and the 1994-
We then group the results and present 
average annual returns, compound annual 
returns, cumulative returns, betas1, the 
average value premium (the difference 
between the returns of the value and 
growth portfolios) and t-statistics for 
testing the null hypothesis that the mean 
returns of the value and the growth 
portfolios are equal.
1  It should be noted that a yearly average of 15% of the stocks did not have betas in Economatica’s database.
2008 period (a more stable period, insofar 
as inflation is concerned). Table 2 below 
shows real per capita GDP change and the 
inflation-adjusted Ibovespa index (at year-
end closing prices) from 1988 to 2008.
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 Table 3  Descriptive statistics of the sample
Year Stocks Stocks 
without 
Beta
Minimum 
P/E
Maximum P/E Median 
P/E
Minimum 
P/B
Maximum P/B Median 
P/B
1989 92 10 0.01000 40.07450 4.01826 0.00357 6.84683 0.55333
1990 94 9 0.00858 422.04647 1.41395 0.00062 9.73782 0.20077
1991 68 18 0.26628 99.99503 2.86410 0.00021 486.63716 0.25284
1992 45 9 1.06702 104.82850 8.34132 0.00002 33,603.47756 0.47685
1993 67 15 0.01562 201.63298 7.73828 0.00230 2.50501 0.39991
1994 74 12 0.79328 75.97840 7.43639 0.07895 2.35153 0.55846
1995 89 14 0.04588 61.86516 6.07080 0.00051 2.21044 0.49928
1996 79 18 0.00400 1,309.82129 5.79644 0.00029 2.66832 0.38199
1997 83 16 0.01459 96.16060 8.45044 0.00069 5.62485 0.56389
1998 90 9 0.00513 137.57232 5.69077 0.00095 8.57853 0.52780
1999 82 17 0.00677 568.90379 4.22422 0.00139 8.18863 0.41460
2000 71 5 0.03041 235.35896 7.23674 0.00315 5.52342 0.62990
2001 87 6 0.03960 232.63071 5.66952 0.00313 6.79930 0.61311
2002 80 10 0.95004 286.59859 5.52774 0.12778 3.58119 0.65305
2003 65 10 1.64937 1,685.64338 5.27123 0.11350 3.40294 0.74346
2004 90 8 1.18880 365.06444 6.84994 0.10500 6.83024 1.11880
2005 91 13 1.72124 380.62106 8.38224 0.09728 14.86244 1.47170
2006 90 17 2.42521 273.22786 9.45302 0.33318 29.94150 2.25758
2007 94 13 4.15439 768.78876 18.94758 0.28304 106.91338 3.08907
2008 93 6 3.21677 45,528.03204 16.17229 0.31646 39.51321 2.67677
Our method entails limitations: a slight 
survivorship bias, given the fact that we 
only included in the sample stocks that 
were being traded one year after portfolio 
formation; stocks are sorted into quartiles, 
which might not have been the best way to 
build portfolios; taxes and transaction costs 
were not accounted for; we only tested for 20 
years, which might seem an eternity in today’s 
hectic investment environment, but is in fact 
an unrepresentative period for the history of 
a stock market.
Our tests point to the unequivocal superiority 
of the value strategy. As shown in Table 4, 
one-dimensional P/E-sorted value portfolios 
averaged an annual compound return of 22.26% 
throughout our 20-year test period, whereas 
the growth portfolio yielded a negative return 
of 3.12%2. The value strategy outperformed 
the growth strategy in each and every period 
analyzed (the sample’s first half, the second half, 
the years prior to the “Plano Real” and the years 
afterwards) and the null hypothesis was rejected 
at the 10% significance level.
2  We excluded from our sample the annual return of 12,415.06% in the year 2001, which was produced by Petroquisa, a Brazilian petrochemical company. Should 
we have left it, value stocks would have generated an annual compounded return of 33.58%. Nonetheless, the case for keeping it should be underlined: Petroquisa’s 
P/Es and P/Bs from 1990 to 2001 signaled a major, irrational bargain.
 3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 3 below shows the descriptive statistics of our sample. 
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 Table 4  Results for one-dimensional P/E-sorted portfolios
Period Metric Quartile 1 
(value)
Quartile 4  
(growth)
Total sample Average value 
premium 
(Q1-Q4)
Average 
p-values
1989-2008 
(Total period)
Average return 46.30% 5.29% 19.32% 41.01 p.p. 0.0001
Compound return 22.26% -3.12% 9.50% 25.38 p.p. -
Cumulative return 5469.24% -46.92% 513.66% 5516.16 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.65 0.68 0.67 -0.03 -
1989-1998 
(First half)
Average return 57.50% 3.05% 17.29% 54.46 p.p. 0.0142
Compound return 12.97% -8.29% 1.54% 21.26 p.p. -
Cumulative return 238.67% -57.90% 16.48% 296.57 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.02 -
1999-2008
(Second half)
Average return 35.09% 7.53% 21.36% 27.56 p.p. 0.0000
Compound return 32.31% 2.35% 18.08% 29.97 p.p. -
Cumulative return 1544.46% 26.09% 426.85% 1518.37 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.59 0.68 0.64 -0.08 -
1989-1993 
(pre-Plano Real)
Average return 107.15% 15.44% 36.34% 91.71 p.p. 0.0409
Compound return 20.98% -4.64% 6.80% 25.62 p.p. -
Cumulative return 159.20% -21.13% 38.95% 180.33 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.79 0.79 0.80 -0.01 -
1994-2008 
(post-Plano Real)
Average return 26.01% 1.91% 13.65% 24.11 p.p. 0.0000
Compound return 22.69% -2.61% 10.41% 25.30 p.p. -
Cumulative return 2048.62% -32.71% 341.63% 2081.32 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.60 0.64 0.63 -0.04 -
Bear Markets 
(89, 90, 92, 95, 
98, 00, 01, 02, 
08)
Average return -10.21% -27.89% -15.60% 17.68 p.p. 0.0001
Compound return -15.03% -30.81% -19.11% 15.78 p.p. -
Cumulative return -76.91% -96.37% -85.18% 19.46 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.64 0.72 0.70 -0.08 -
Bull Markets 
(remaining years)
Average return 107.12% 27.24% 47.49% 79.88 p.p. 0.0013
Compound return 64.66% 27.61% 40.28% 37.05 p.p. -
Cumulative return 24021.02% 1360.94% 4040.76% 22660.08 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.62 0.66 0.65 -0.04 -
Contractions 
(90, 91, 92, 98, 
99, 01, 03)
Average return 99.72% 17.82% 42.09% 81.90 p.p. 0.0067
Compound return 45.62% 8.42% 27.48% 37.19 p.p. -
Cumulative return 1288.20% 76.15% 447.05% 1212.05 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.59 0.66 0.65 -0.08 -
Expansions 
(remaining years)
Average return 17.53% -1.46% 7.07% 18.99 p.p. 0.0001
Compound return 11.28% -8.81% 0.89% 20.09 p.p. -
Cumulative return 301.18% -69.87% 12.18% 371.05 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.68 0.69 0.68 -0.01 -
Risk analysis tells the same story. Value 
outperformed growth by a sizeable premium 
in all states of the economy. Attention 
should be drawn to the fact that the value 
portfolio’s outperformance during economic 
contractions was much greater than during 
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expansions. Value’s betas were somewhat 
smaller (save for the sample’s first half). Thus, 
our results echo the ones found by Lakonishok 
et al. (1994) and suggest that value stocks are 
less risky and yield higher returns, in stark 
contrast to the EMS’s propositions.
Panels A and B of Table 5 show the results 
for the one-dimensional P/B-sorted portfolios 
and the two-dimensional portfolios, 
respectively. Results were smaller than P/E 
sorted portfolios’ but, in both strategies, 
value stocks confirmed their dominance: 
compound value premium totaled 19.22% 
when applying the two-dimensional strategy 
and 18.34% when sorting on P/Bs. Thus, 
contrary to Lakonishok et al. (1994), we did 
not find better results for the two-dimensional 
strategies, as the corresponding figure for the 
P/E-sorted portfolios was 25.38%.
We believe P/Bs’ (and as a consequence, 
the two-dimensional’s) underperformance 
may be due to the fact that investors buy stocks 
expecting future cash flows. Graham and 
Meredith (1998) argue that book value may be 
an important metric in security analysis only 
in exceptional cases and that the success of an 
investment depends primarily on its earning 
power. Therefore, it would be reasonable to 
expect that P/E - a metric that captures earning 
power - would perform better than P/B, which 
is an indicator of the hard assets of the company, 
which may be outdated or obsolete.
 Table 5  Results for one-dimensional P/B-sorted portfolios and for two-dimensional portfolios
PANEL A: Results for one-dimensional P/B-sorted portfolios
Period Metric Quartile 1 
(value)
Quartile 4  
(growth)
Total sample Average value 
premium 
(Q1-Q4)
Average 
p-values
1989-2008 
(Total period)
Average return 30.42% 3.21% 19.32% 27.21 p.p. 0.0001
Compound return 15.68% -2.66% 9.50% 18.34 p.p. -
Cumulative return 1740.81% -41.69% 513.66% 1782.50 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.72 0.66 0.67 0.06 -
1989-1998 
(First half)
Average return 30.94% -7.64% 17.29% 38.58 p.p. 0.0034
Compound return 4.92% -12.97% 1.54% 17.89 p.p. -
Cumulative return 61.60% -75.07% 16.48% 136.67 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.72 0.68 0.70 0.04 -
1999-2008
(Second half)
Average return 29.90% 14.06% 21.36% 15.84 p.p. 0.0045
Compound return 27.54% 8.87% 18.08% 18.67 p.p. -
Cumulative return 1039.10% 133.90% 426.85% 905.20 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.72 0.63 0.64 0.08 -
1989-1993 
(pre-Plano Real)
Average return 57.58% -3.44% 36.34% 61.02 p.p. 0.0195
Compound return 7.23% -13.11% 6.80% 20.34 p.p. -
Cumulative return 41.74% -50.48% 38.95% 92.23 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.00 -
1994-2008 
(post-Plano Real)
Average return 21.37% 5.43% 13.65% 15.94 p.p. 0.0005
Compound return 18.64% 1.10% 10.41% 17.55 p.p. -
Cumulative return 1198.69% 17.75% 341.63% 1180.94 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.69 0.61 0.63 0.08 -
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Period Metric Quartile 1 
(value)
Quartile 4  
(growth)
Total sample Average value 
premium 
(Q1-Q4)
Average 
p-values
Bear Markets 
(89, 90, 92, 95, 
98, 00, 01, 02, 
08)
Average return -12.39% -20.35% -15.60% 7.96 p.p. 0.1631
Compound return -18.44% -23.58% -19.11% 5.15 p.p. -
Cumulative return -84.02% -91.11% -85.18% 7.09 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.00 -
Bull Markets 
(remaining years)
Average return 72.13% 15.42% 47.49% 56.72 p.p. 0.0001
Compound return 53.96% 18.65% 40.28% 35.31 p.p. -
Cumulative return 11422.73% 556.14% 4040.76% 10866.59 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.68 0.63 0.65 0.05 -
Contractions 
(90, 91, 92, 98, 
99, 01, 03)
Average return 52.00% 18.80% 42.09% 33.21 p.p. 0.0790
Compound return 27.22% 13.77% 27.48% 13.45 p.p. -
Cumulative return 439.22% 146.65% 447.05% 292.57 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.01 -
Expansions 
(remaining years)
Average return 18.80% -5.18% 7.07% 23.98 p.p. 0.0002
Compound return 9.91% -10.50% 0.89% 20.41 p.p. -
Cumulative return 241.38% -76.36% 12.18% 317.74 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.74 0.65 0.68 0.09 -
PANEL B: Results for two-dimensional portfolios
Period Metric Portfolio 1 
(value)
Portfolio 9  
(growth)
Total sample Average value 
premium 
(P1-P4)
Average 
p-values
1989-2008 
(Total period)
Average return 36.57% 6.45% 19.32% 30.13 p.p. 0.0000
Compound return 18.70% -0.52% 9.50% 19.22 p.p. -
Cumulative return 2983.10% -9.94% 513.66% 2993.04 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.02 -
1989-1998 
(First half)
Average return 41.94% -0.15% 17.29% 42.09 p.p. 0.0020
Compound return 9.42% -8.55% 1.54% 17.97 p.p. -
Cumulative return 145.92% -59.09% 16.48% 205.01 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.71 0.68 0.70 0.03 -
1999-2008
(Second half)
Average return 31.21% 13.05% 21.36% 18.16 p.p. 0.0001
Compound return 28.77% 8.21% 18.08% 20.56 p.p. -
Cumulative return 1153.70% 120.15% 426.85% 1033.55 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.00 -
1989-1993 
(pre-Plano Real)
Average return 77.30% 6.91% 36.34% 70.39 p.p. 0.0081
Compound return 14.70% -7.91% 6.80% 22.61 p.p. -
Cumulative return 98.55% -33.75% 38.95% 132.30 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.80 0.79 0.80 0.00 -
1994-2008 
(post-Plano Real)
Average return 23.00% 6.29% 13.65% 16.70 p.p. 0.0000
Compound return 20.06% 2.07% 10.41% 17.99 p.p. -
Cumulative return 1452.82% 35.95% 341.63% 1416.87 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.02 -
continued
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Period Metric Portfolio 1 
(value)
Portfolio 9  
(growth)
Total sample Average value 
premium 
(P1-P4)
Average 
p-values
Bear Markets 
(89, 90, 92, 95, 
98, 00, 01, 02, 
08)
Average return -11.53% -22.01% -15.60% 10.48 p.p. 0.0012
Compound return -16.60% -25.15% -19.11% 8.54 p.p. -
Cumulative return -80.48% -92.62% -85.18% 12.14 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.69 0.73 0.70 -0.04 -
Bull Markets 
(remaining years)
Average return 85.79% 24.26% 47.49% 61.53 p.p. 0.0002
Compound return 58.44% 25.54% 40.28% 32.90 p.p. -
Cumulative return 15696.12% 1120.63% 4040.76% 14575.49 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.01 -
Contractions 
(90, 91, 92, 98, 
99, 01, 03)
Average return 70.96% 22.14% 42.09% 48.82 p.p. 0.0138
Compound return 35.46% 15.56% 27.48% 19.90 p.p. -
Cumulative return 736.83% 175.16% 447.05% 561.67 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.64 0.65 0.65 -0.02 -
Expansions 
(remaining years)
Average return 18.06% -2.00% 7.07% 20.06 p.p. 0.0016
Compound return 10.55% -8.23% 0.89% 18.78 p.p. -
Cumulative return 268.43% -67.27% 12.18% 335.69 p.p. -
Average Beta 0.71 0.68 0.68 0.03 -
continued
Table 6 presents a summary of the compound annual returns, permitting easy comparison 
of all strategies tested.
 Table 6  Summary of findings
Period Ratios Value Portfolio Growth  
Portfolio
Value Premium Ho rejected at the 
10% level?
1989-2008 
(Total period)
P/E 22.26% -3.12% 25.38 p.p. Yes
P/B 15.68% -2.66% 18.34 p.p. Yes
P/E + P/B 18.70% -0.52% 19.22 p.p. Yes
1989-1998 
(First half)
P/E 12.97% -8.29% 21.26 p.p. Yes
P/B 4.92% -12.97% 17.89 p.p. Yes
P/E + P/B 9.42% -8.55% 17.97 p.p. Yes
1999-2008 
(Second half)
P/E 32.31% 2.35% 29.96 p.p. Yes
P/B 27.54% 8.87% 18.67 p.p. Yes
P/E + P/B 28.77% 8.21% 20.56 p.p. Yes
1989-1993 
(pre-Plano Real)
P/E 20.98% -4.64% 25.62 p.p. Yes
P/B 7.23% -13.11% 20.34 p.p. Yes
P/E + P/B 14.70% -7.91% 22.61 p.p. Yes
1994-2008 
(post-Plano Real)
P/E 22.69% -2.61% 25.30 p.p. Yes
P/B 18.64% 1.10% 17.54 p.p. Yes
P/E + P/B 20.06% 2.07% 17.99 p.p. Yes
Bear markets 
(89, 90, 92, 95, 98, 
00, 01, 02, 08)
P/E -15.03% -30.81% 15.78 p.p. Yes
P/B -18.44% -23.58% 5.14 p.p. No
P/E + P/B -16.60% -25.15% 8.55 p.p. Yes
continue
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Period Ratios Value Portfolio Growth  
Portfolio
Value Premium Ho rejected at the 
10% level?
Bull markets 
(remaining years)
P/E 64.66% 27.61% 37.05 p.p. Yes
P/B 53.96% 18.65% 35.31 p.p. Yes
P/E + P/B 58.44% 25.54% 32.90 p.p. Yes
Contractions 
(90, 91, 92, 98, 99, 
01, 03)
P/E 45.62% 8.42% 37.20 p.p. Yes
P/B 27.22% 13.77% 13.45 p.p. Yes
P/E + P/B 35.46% 15.56% 19.90 p.p. Yes
Expansions 
(remaining years)
P/E 11.28% -8.81% 20.09 p.p. Yes
P/B 9.91% -10.50% 20.41 p.p. Yes
P/E + P/B 10.55% -8.23% 18.78 p.p. Yes
continued
The value strategy’s superiority can be 
easily grasped by focusing on the fifth column, 
which shows the pervasive and sizeable value 
premium. Table 5 also highlights the remarkable 
results produced by the P/E-sorted portfolios. 
Compared to the other strategies, spreads only 
lagged during expansions by a tiny margin 
(0.32%); they otherwise ranged from a minimum 
of 1.74% to a maximum of 23.75%. The null 
hypothesis was not rejected only during bear 
markets when sorting on P/Bs. Also noteworthy 
is the fact that both portfolios showed a positive 
performance during economic contractions, 
suggesting stock markets’ tendency to anticipate 
economic improvements.
Graph 1 below portrays the evolution of 
a $1 invested in each strategy throughout the 
holding period. Also shown is the real return 
(i.e., inflation-adjusted) of the Ibovespa 
Index, the most comprehensive stock index 
for the Brazilian stock market.
Given the methodological and time frame 
differences, it is not possible to draw direct 
comparisons between our results and those of 
other Brazilian studies. Nonetheless, it is worth of 
notice that, according our computations, Braga 
and Leal (2004) found a 18.55 p.p. yearly value 
spread on P/B-sorted portfolios. This is similar 
to our 17.89 p.p. spread found in a similar period 
(1989-1998). On the other hand, Lucena et al 
(2008) found a yearly spread of 53.01% p.p. (our 
computations), which is significantly higher than 
our yearly 23.30% p.p. for a similar period.
Graph 1  Evolution of a $1 invested in each strategy on a linear scale
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